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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MATTHEW MARCHAND, ; 
Petitioner/Appellee, ^ 
and J 
KRISTIE MARCHAND, \ 
Respondent/Appellant, ( 
i BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
i Appellate Case No.: 20051105 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Respondent/Appellant (hereinafter "Appellant") submits the following as 
Reply Brief in response to Appellee's Brief in the above matter: 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING PARENTAL 
PELESUMPTION AND TREATING BOTH PARTIES ON EQUAL 
GROUND. 
"In a controversy over custody, the paramount consideration is the best 
interest of the child, but where one party to the controversy is a non-parent, there 
is a presumption in favor of the natural parent." Walton v. Coffman, 169 P. 2d 97 
(1946). Appellee argues that the Appellant failed to raise the issue that the 
Appellee was not the father in the case. However, the trial court raised concerns in 
granting custody to the Appellee because he was not the biological father of the 
child. 
Okay, so the situation then is what the custody 
evaluator basically said, okay, we have the history of 
Brittany with mom and with grandparents in Arizona 
and these other things and now very little time with the 
petitioner and then I don't know if they question this 
or I don't know what the issue is but we have a 
petitioner here whose not the biological father of the 
child but says that that doesn't bother him because he's 
always considered her his child. We have him married 
to a second wife now who says okay; I will welcome 
the child even though she has a child of her owi1 and 
Brittany is neither one of their children's biological 
child and they haven't had a lot of history with the 
child. But putting them in that situation is better than 
what she's been (inaudible) because we don't have any 
history or background besides a few week here and 
there to see anything different. 
(R p 560,1 'age 423 lit les 16 25 ai id p 1:24 lines 1-6 of" I rial I ranscript). The 
Appellee never objected to or argued against the court stating that the Appellee 
was not the biological father. The court had the duty to follow the law and 
consider parental presumption in determining custod) In this case. 
All of the previous case law dealing with parental presumption seeks to 
protect the best interests of the child being with hi- „, biological parent "A 
loi ig line of I Jtal I cases deals w ith cl lild a istody _ :•* t\ veen t iati iral parents 
and persons other than natural parents. Although a review of these decisions 
shows that the results depended heavily on the facts, this Court has consistently 
slalal (li;i( IIIICHJ is a picsimipliuii in l;i\ wi <A JI iiitlui.il fiaiuil \ liu lias (IK I ,iiu 
custody, and control of his or her child. Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P. 2d 1248 
(Utah 1987). It is well documented that children have a nmclI better upbringing if 
a biological parent raises them. "It is rooted in the common experience of 
or bond for each other, that a natural parent will normally sacrifice personal 
interest and welfare for the child's benefit, and that a natural parent is normally 
more sympathetic and understanding and better able to win the confidence and 
love of the child than anyone else." Hutchison v. Hutchison 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 
1982). (quoting Walton v. Coffman, 169 P.2d 97, 103). Thus, it would be in the 
best interests of the minor child that the court considers parental presumption in 
this case. 
Appellee raises various arguments that res judicata and the Utah Uniform 
Parentage Act prevent the Appellant from raising the issue after the decree of 
divorce that the Appellee is the non-biological father. However, it is apparent that 
there was a mutual mistake on behalf of both parties that the minor child was an 
issue to the parties' marriage. A mutual mistake should not eliminate and/or waive 
a party's inherent and natural right to raising her own child instead of a non-
biological parent. "If the [parental] presumption could be rebutted merely by 
evidence that a non-parent would be a superior custodian, the parent's natural right 
to custody could be rendered illusory and with it the child's natural right to be 
reared, where possible, by his or her natural parent." Hutchison at 41. 
In addition, if this court were to uphold the lower courts decision to grant 
custody to the Appellee without showing anything additional other than being 
superior parent, at what point is merely showing that the Appellee is the superior 
is not enough? For example, Appellee has recently filed with the trial court a 
Petition to Modify the Order of Modification to restrict the Appellants parent time 
3 
with her child to supervised parent time. Should there be any additional factors 
that would prevent the trial court from ordering supervised parent time in this case 
other than the standard what is in the best interests of the child? 
By the same token, we conclude that the right of a 
parent not to be deprived of parental rights without a 
showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial 
neglect is so fundamental to our society and so basic to 
our constitutional order (see the authorities quoted in 
Part III of this opinion) that it ranks among those rights 
referred to in Article I, § 25 of the Utah Constitution 
and the Ninth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution as being retained by the people. 
In re P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 1982). If the present course of action were to 
take place, Appellants parental rights to her natural child could be slowly eroded 
by merely the standard of what is in the best interests of the minor child. This 
course of reasoning is contradictory to the Appellants constitutional right to raise 
her own natural child. Therefore, there should be additional safe guards in 
removing the Appellants natural rights to her child and it was an error for the court 
to grant custody of the minor child to the Appellee without applying parental 
presumption. 
A. THE UTAH UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT DOES NOT 
PREVENT THE ISSUE OF PATERNITY BEING RAISED 
AFTER ADJUDICATION. 
Appellee argues that the Utah Uniform Parentage Act prevents the mother 
from rebutting the adjudication of the Appellee being the father of the child in the 
divorce action. However, there are provisions in the Act that allow the 
adjudication of paternity to be challenged. "A party to an adjudication of paternity 
may challenge the adjudication only under law of this state relating to appeal, 
vacation of judgments, or other judicial review." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-
623(6). It was not determined until after the parties divorce in this matter that the 
Appellee was not the biological father. In essence, it was a mutual mistake on both 
parties to stipulate prior to the decree of divorce that the child was an issue to the 
marriage. 
We have previously held that a mistake of fact or false 
assumption may be grounds for relief under rule 
60(b)(7) or pursuant to an independent action in equity 
regardless of the length of time that has passed: 
Mistake of fact may be grounds under an action in 
equity to grant relief as provided under Rule 60(b)(7). 
It states Many other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of a judgment." Further, the Supreme Court 
of this state has ruled erroneous assumptions may be 
grounds for entering a new order. 
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,435 (Utah 1993), Presently, the Rule allowing a 
party may be relieved of a judgment based upon "any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment" is Utah R. Civ P. 60(b)(6). As a result, the 
Utah Uniform Parentage Act does allow the Appellant to rebut the previous 
adjudication of the Appellee being the father of the child in this case. 
In addition, adjudication of the Appellee being the father of the minor child 
has no binding effect on the child in this case. 
(2) A child is not bound by a determination of 
parentage under this chapter unless: 
(a) the determination was based on an unrescinded 
declaration of paternity and the declaration is 
consistent with the results of genetic testing; 
(b) the adjudication of parentage was based on a 
finding consistent with the results of genetic testing 
and the consistency is declared in the determination or 
is otherwise shown; or 
(c) the child was a party or was represented in the 
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proceeding determining parentage by a guardian ad 
litem. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-623(2). There were never any genetic results provided 
in this case that would support the Appellee being the father of the minor child. In 
addition, the minor child was not represented by a guardian ad litem in the divorce 
action. Therefore, the child is not bound by the adjudication of the Appellee being 
the father of the minor child. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER THE APPELLEE WAS THE NON-BIOLOGICAL 
FATHER WAS NOT RAISED 
The Appellee argues that Appellants Motion for a New Trial was based on 
newly discovered evidence that the Appellee was not the biological father. 
However, as previously mentioned above it was perfectly clear to the court and all 
of the participants during the trial that the Appellee was not the biological father. 
The Appellee never objected or argued against the Appellee not being the 
biological father. There was no reason to present the DNA testing at trial, since it 
was never disputed during the trial that the Appellee was not the biological father. 
THE COURT: Is it your understanding that Matt had 
any idea before this paternity testing thing? 
KATHRYN KAIR: He reported that someone had 
suggested to him that he might not be the biological 
father before Kristie gave birth and — 
THE COURT: Who did the paternity test, Steve or 
Matt? 
KATHRYN KAIR: Well, they probably both did but 
Steve did one. 
(R. p.559, Paige 29 lines 24-25 and Page 30 lines 1-7 of Trial 
Transcript) 
MS. CLINE (counsel for Appellee): We were just 
talking about the paternity issue before the break. 
THE COURT: Could I just ask a question about that? 
If somebody can refresh my mind. If, is it Mr. Rogers? 
MS. CLINE: Burton. 
THE COURT: Steven Burton? 
MS. CLINE: That's correct. 
(R. p. 559, Page 51 line 19-25 of Trial Transcript). The Appellee even offered the 
name of the biological father to the court. As a result, it would have been a moot 
point for the Appellant to present the results of the DNA test to the trial court. 
Therefore, the issue was raised properly and the court should have granted a new 
trial based on the fact that its decision was based upon an error of law. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE 
LORD MANSFIELD'S RULE IN DENYING APPELLANTS 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
The Appellee argues that the Lord's Mansfield Rule still applies in this 
state and the court correctly applied the Rule in this case. However, the Appellee 
fails to recognize or consider that it has been expressly rejected by the Utah 
Legislature and Appellate Courts of this state. Since the establishment of DNA 
and blood testing to establish reliable paternity testing, the Utah legislature has 
specified that certain nontraditional evidence is capable of conclusively rebutting 
the presumption of legitimacy. In Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106, 107 (Utah 1986), 
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the court observed that Lord Mansfield's rule has been substantially eroded by the 
enactment of section 78-25-18 of the code, which expressly mandates that courts 
utilize blood tests to assist in making a determination of paternity. The effect of 
Lord Mansfield's rule has been substantially eroded by the enactment of U.C.A., 
1953, §78-25-18, which provides unequivocally that "in any civil action or in 
bastardy proceedings in which the parentage of a person is a relevant fact, the 
court shall order the child and alleged parents to submit to blood tests." Since 
Teece, 78-25-18 has been replaced with the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, which 
allows the use of DNA testing to rebut the presumption of paternity. Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45g- et seq. Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the trial court 
incorrectly applied and used the Lord Mansfield's Rule as a basis in its ruling. 
III. A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED BASED UPON THE 
NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL 
It was clearly an error on the part of previous counsel for the Appellant that 
parental presumption was not raised during the trial. The common law recognized 
that incompetence or neglect of counsel, under some circumstances, would entitle 
a litigant to a new trial. Garrett v. Osborn, 431 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1968). In a 
concurring opinion by Chief Justice Crockett of the Utah Supreme Court, which is 
concurred by two other justices, Chief Justice Crocket went out of his way in his 
opinion stating in dicta on whether a new trial should be granted in a civil case for 
negligence of counsel. Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., 598 P.2d 336, 341 (1979). 
Monetary damages will not correct the injustice of the Appellant losing custody of 
her only daughter. The only way to correct the injustice on the part of Appellants 
counsel is to order a new trial on all the issues or on issues limited in determining 
parental presumption. Therefore, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court grant a new trial in this matter. 
IV. THE PEARSON V, PEARSON CASE HAS NO BEARING ON 
THIS CASE 
The Appellee has argued in support of his postion that the Pearson v. Pearson 
case, recently decided before this court, has a direct bearing on this case. 
However, there are vast difference between this case and the Pearson case. 
In Pearson, the minor child was born in September 1999, and Father was 
named as the father on his birth certificate. Father and Mother raised the child 
together until they separated in May 2000. After separation and until the trial 
court's custody determination on May 11, 2003, the Pearsons voluntarily shared 
physical custody of the minor on a fifty-fifty basis. Pearson v. Pearson, 134 P. 3d 
173(UtahApp2006). 
In this case, the parties' minor child was born on September 10, 2000. The 
parties separated in or about June 2000. Appellee filed for divorce and it became 
final January 10, 2001. From February 2001 through April 2001, Appellee had 
consistent visitation with Brittney. In or about April 2001, Appellant relocated to 
Arizona. In May 2001, Appellee relocated to the state of Illinois and returned to 
the state of Utah in November 2001. (R. p.448) Since Appellant moved to 
Arizona, Appellee spent 17 days in 2001, 21 days in 2002, 39 in 2003, and over 50 
in2004.(R.p.458). 
As opposed to the Pearson case, the Appellee never lived with the minor 
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child and never exercised parent time more than 20% of the time prior to the 
minor child reaching the age of five. The minor child's relationship with the 
Appellee was minimal at best. Thus, challenging the paternity of the Appellee 
would not have been detrimental to the child. The parties separated before the 
child was even bom. The Schoolcraft analysis should not apply in this case since 
disputing paternity in this case would have caused minimal disruption to the minor 
child and the parties had separated prior to the child being bom. Therefore, the 
Pearson case is not on point with this case. 
CONCLUSION 
In the interests of justice, the trial courts decision should be overturned for 
the reasons stated. 
Dated thi 
DAVID A. P E D K A Z ^ ' 
4001 S. 700 E, Suite 500 
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